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1 sensory need
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2 sensory need
1) Механика: необходимость очувствления2) Робототехника: мн. потребности в сенсорике, необходимость очувствления (робота) -
3 sensory need
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4 sensory need
необходимость очувствления, потребности в сенсорике
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5 sensory
сенсорный
– sensory capabilities
– sensory channel
– sensory command
– sensory computer
– sensory data
– sensory device
– sensory feedback
– sensory guidance
– sensory head
– sensory information
– sensory input
– sensory intelligence
– sensory need
– sensory operation
– sensory perception
– sensory processor
– sensory robot
– sensory steering
– sensory subsystem
– sensory support
– sensory system
– sensory test
– sensory transducer
– sensory unit
– sensory-based decision-making
– sensory-based motion
– sensory-based program
– sensory-based robot
– sensory-based servo
– sensory-based system
– sensory-controlled robot
– sensory-information system
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6 need
1. n надобность, нуждаhe felt the need of money — он нуждался в деньгах, у него было трудно с деньгами
if need be — если бы потребовалось, в случае нужды
2. n потребности, нужды; запросы3. n нужда, бедность; нищетаto live in need — нуждаться, жить в нищете
4. n недостаток, нехваткаfor need of — из-за недостатка, вследствие отсутствия
5. n беда, трудное положение6. n стремление7. n редк. то, что нужноpoorer than was need — беднее, чем следовало
I need time to rest — мне нужно время, чтобы отдохнуть
8. v нуждаться, иметь надобность, потребностьneed for — нуждаться в; потребность
9. v требовать, чувствовать необходимостьthat needs no saying — это само собой разумеется; это ясно без слов
to need a lot of asking — заставлять себя просить; не сразу соглашаться
he needed no second invitation — он не заставил себя просить, он сразу принял приглашение
it needs to … — нужно
it needs to be done carefully — это надо сделать тщательно; это дело требует осторожности
he does not need to be told — ему нечего об этом говорить;
it needed the horrors of war to open their eyes — нужны были ужасы войны, чтобы у них открылись глаза; только ужасы войны открыли им глаза
10. v ирон. заслуживать11. v нуждаться, бедствоватьto need the spur — нуждаться в понукании, быть медлительным
Синонимический ряд:1. insufficiency (noun) demand; inadequacy; insufficiency; lack; occasion; shortage; use2. necessity (noun) compulsion; emergency; essential; exigency; necessity; requirement; urgency3. obligation (noun) charge; commitment; committal; devoir; duty; must; obligation; ought4. poverty (noun) beggary; borasca; deprivation; destituteness; destitution; distress; impecuniousness; impoverishment; indigence; indigency; neediness; pauperism; pennilessness; penury; poorness; poverty; privation; unprosperousness; want5. lack (verb) be destitute; be in want; be inadequate; be short; crave; demand; lack; require; suffer privation; want6. must (verb) have; mustАнтонимический ряд:fortune; fullness; have; incidental; independence; luxury; opulence; plenty; property; riches; wealth -
7 insistent need
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8 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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9 Consciousness
Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.... Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. (T. Nagel, 1979, pp. 165-166)This approach to understanding sensory qualia is both theoretically and empirically motivated... [;] it suggests an effective means of expressing the allegedly inexpressible. The "ineffable" pink of one's current visual sensation may be richly and precisely expressed as a 95Hz/80Hz/80Hz "chord" in the relevant triune cortical system. The "unconveyable" taste sensation produced by the fabled Australian health tonic Vegamite might be poignantly conveyed as a 85/80/90/15 "chord" in one's four channeled gustatory system.... And the "indescribably" olfactory sensation produced by a newly opened rose might be quite accurately described as a 95/35/10/80/60/55 "chord" in some six-dimensional space within one's olfactory bulb. (P. M. Churchland, 1989, p. 106)One of philosophy's favorite facets of mentality has received scant attention from cognitive psychologists, and that is consciousness itself: fullblown, introspective, inner-world phenomenological consciousness. In fact if one looks in the obvious places... one finds not so much a lack of interest as a deliberate and adroit avoidance of the issue. I think I know why. Consciousness appears to be the last bastion of occult properties, epiphenomena, and immeasurable subjective states-in short, the one area of mind best left to the philosophers, who are welcome to it. Let them make fools of themselves trying to corral the quicksilver of "phenomenology" into a respectable theory. (Dennett, 1978b, p. 149)When I am thinking about anything, my consciousness consists of a number of ideas.... But every idea can be resolved into elements... and these elements are sensations. (Titchener, 1910, p. 33)A Darwin machine now provides a framework for thinking about thought, indeed one that may be a reasonable first approximation to the actual brain machinery underlying thought. An intracerebral Darwin Machine need not try out one sequence at a time against memory; it may be able to try out dozens, if not hundreds, simultaneously, shape up new generations in milliseconds, and thus initiate insightful actions without overt trial and error. This massively parallel selection among stochastic sequences is more analogous to the ways of darwinian biology than to the "von Neumann" serial computer. Which is why I call it a Darwin Machine instead; it shapes up thoughts in milliseconds rather than millennia, and uses innocuous remembered environments rather than noxious real-life ones. It may well create the uniquely human aspect of our consciousness. (Calvin, 1990, pp. 261-262)To suppose the mind to exist in two different states, in the same moment, is a manifest absurdity. To the whole series of states of the mind, then, whatever the individual, momentary successive states may be, I give the name of our consciousness.... There are not sensations, thoughts, passions, and also consciousness, any more than there is quadruped or animal, as a separate being to be added to the wolves, tygers, elephants, and other living creatures.... The fallacy of conceiving consciousness to be something different from the feeling, which is said to be its object, has arisen, in a great measure, from the use of the personal pronoun I. (T. Brown, 1970, p. 336)The human capacity for speech is certainly unique. But the gulf between it and the behavior of animals no longer seems unbridgeable.... What does this leave us with, then, which is characteristically human?.... t resides in the human capacity for consciousness and self-consciousness. (Rose, 1976, p. 177)[Human consciousness] depends wholly on our seeing the outside world in such categories. And the problems of consciousness arise from putting reconstitution beside internalization, from our also being able to see ourselves as if we were objects in the outside world. That is in the very nature of language; it is impossible to have a symbolic system without it.... The Cartesian dualism between mind and body arises directly from this, and so do all the famous paradoxes, both in mathematics and in linguistics.... (Bronowski, 1978, pp. 38-39)It seems to me that there are at least four different viewpoints-or extremes of viewpoint-that one may reasonably hold on the matter [of computation and conscious thinking]:A. All thinking is computation; in particular, feelings of conscious awareness are evoked merely by the carrying out of appropriate computations.B. Awareness is a feature of the brain's physical action; and whereas any physical action can be simulated computationally, computational simulation cannot by itself evoke awareness.C. Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally.D. Awareness cannot be explained by physical, computational, or any other scientific terms. (Penrose, 1994, p. 12)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Consciousness
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